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NOTES
CAPPING THE BOTTLE ON
UNCERTAINTY:
CLOSING THE INFORMATION
LOOPHOLE IN THE GREAT LAKES-ST.
LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER
RESOURCES COMPACT
"When the Well's dry, we know the Worth of Water."
-Benjamin Franklin
Will the Great Lakes be depleted by "water barons" 2 who profit by
withdrawing Great Lakes water, placing it into bottles, and selling it
to thirsty consumers around the world? Concern that such depletion
might take place resurfaced in 1998, when Nova Group, a Canadian
organization, devised a plan to help meet the growing demand for
water in Asia by shipping Great Lakes water to China.3 Nova Group
received a five-year permit from the Ontario Ministry of Environment
to export 158 million gallons of water per year from Lake Superior.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANACK 132 (1746), reprinted in 3 PAPERS
OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 62 (Leonard W. LaBaree ed., 1961).

2 Gitte Laasby, U.S. House Ratifies Great Lakes Compact, MERRILLVILLE POST-TRIB.,
Sept. 24, 2008, at A8.

3

See PETER ANNIN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS 193 (2006).
4 See id. at 194 ("The document gave the Nova Group permission to export 158 million
gallons of water to Asia per year-one tanker at a time."); see also DAVID R. BOYD,
UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 57 (2003)
(stating that the permit allowed shipment of 600 million liters, the metric equivalent of 158
million gallons, of water per year).
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Ontario officials eventually cancelled the permit,5 but the episode led
to a cry to "create a modem, binding, international water-management
system to regulate Great Lakes withdrawals for the next century and
beyond."6 As a result, legislators enacted two agreements: (1) the
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources
Agreement,7 a non-binding agreement between the United States and
Canada to implement policies protecting Great Lakes water from
diversions; and (2) the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water
Resources Compact (Compact),8 a binding agreement among the
eight Great Lakes states.9
Enactment of the Compact, however, has not resolved the ongoing
debate over the potential threat of exporting water from the Great
Lakes. Rather, enactment of the Compact has sparked a new debate
over a provision in the Compact that some argue will make exporting
Great Lakes water easier, the so-called "bottled water loophole." The
Compact, which aims to protect the long-term sustainability of the
Great Lakes, generally prohibits the transfer of water from the Great
Lakes basin to other locations.10 Under the Compact, for example,
Las Vegas would be prohibited from building a pipeline to pump
water out of the Great Lakes to meet its growing water demand.
Because of the bottled water exemption, however, private companies
would not be prohibited from selling the same Great Lakes water to
Las Vegas, as long as the water was incorporated into bottles rather
than pumped directly." The distinction between permitting the export
of water in products but not pipes has been described as the "bottled
water loophole" and has sparked considerable debate.
The debate surrounding the so-called bottled water exemption has
centered on whether or not bottled water companies should be
permitted to withdraw, bottle, and sell water from the Great Lakes.
One side of the debate argues that the bottled water exemption
will permit companies to bottle and sell so much water that it will
5 See BOYD, supra note 4, at 57 (noting that "[i]n response to vocal public opposition, the
Ontario government quickly cancelled Nova's permit").
6 ANNIN, supra note 3, at 196; see also BOYD, supra note 4, at 58 (observing that the
Nova permit, as well as other similar proposals, forced the Canadian government to "finally take
action on bulk water exports").
7 Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement,
Dec. 13, 2005, available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/GreatLakes
-StLawrenceRiverBasinSustainable WaterResourcesAgreement.pdf [hereinafter Water
Agreement].
8 Pub. L. No. 110-342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008) [hereinafter Compact].
9 See ANNIN, supra note 3, at 211-12.
1oSee Compact § 4.8, 122 Stat. at 3752 (prohibiting all diversions of water from the Great
Lakes Basin unless permitted under the Compact).
" See id. § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 3740-41 (noting that a diversion does not include water
transferred out of the basin as part of a "product," which encompasses bottled water).
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deplete the resource and undermine the Compact's purpose of
ensuring the long-term sustainability of the Great Lakes basin.12
The other side claims that eliminating the bottled water exemption
will impose unnecessary costs because exporting bottled water and
other water-containing products will have no adverse long-term
effects on the Great Lakes system.13
Both sides of the debate ground their arguments on different
assumptions about the long-term effect on the Great Lakes basin of
exporting bottled water. Determining which assumption is correct is
difficult because there is considerable uncertainty about the future
cumulative impact of removing water from the Great Lakes basin in
bottles and other small containers.14 More information is needed to
better evaluate each side's position.
This Note presents a different "loophole" in the Compact-an
"information loophole." The information loophole exists because the
Compact requires Great Lakes states to develop a registration and
reporting system for water uses but mandates that only some, not all,
water uses are reported.' 5 Specifically, if bottled water companies and
other producers were not exempted from the ban on diversions, they
would need to report all of the water that leaves the basin in bottles.
Because they are exempted, however, only those who withdraw
over 100,000 gallons per day are required to register and report
under the Compact, unless individual states adopt more stringent
requirements.16 Moreover, even for those withdrawals that are
reported, the Compact does little to address the inaccurate reporting
that results from estimating withdrawals, and inconsistencies across
the basin in calculating how much water is used up in different
processes and not returned to the basin. 17 Finally, while the Compact
12 Kari Lydersen, Bottled Water at Issue in Great Lakes: Conservation and Commerce
Clash, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2008, at A7; Susan Saulny, Congress Nears Ban on Diverting
Water from Great Lakes Basin, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at Al 8.
13 Lydersen, supra note 12; Saulny, supra note 12.
14 See INT'L JOINT COMM'N, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES: FINAL

REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 22 (2000), available at

http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/IJC2000Report.pdf [hereinafter UC 2000 REPORT]
("For the 21st century, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding factors such as future
consumptive use, small-scale removals of water, and climate change. . . . Although there are
insufficient data and inadequate scientific understanding to place precise estimates on the
magnitude and timing of such impacts, the impacts could be significant.").
'5 See Compact § 4.1, 122 Stat. at 3747-48.
16 See id. § 4.1.3, 122 Stat. at 3747-48.
" See VICTORIA PEBBLES, GREAT LAKES COMM'N, MEASURING AND ESTIMATING
CONSUMPTIVE USE OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER 15 (2003) ("[Clonsumptive use data is

often an estimate of an estimate - the original withdrawal is estimated and the consumptive
use coefficient is an estimate."); see also ENV'T CAN. & U.S. ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY,
STATE OF THE GREAT LAKES 2009, at 287-88 (2009) [hereinafter STATE OF THE GREAT

LAKES 2009], available at http://binational.net/solec/sogl2009/SOGL

2009_en.pdf (noting
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stresses that information about withdrawals shall be made publicly
available,' 8 it permits states to report aggregate information and
to withhold information that a state determines to be confidential.19
This Note argues that this "information loophole" should be closed
in order to reduce uncertainty and improve decision making
about the cumulative effect of exporting bottled water and other
water-containing products from the Great Lakes basin.
Part I presents the ongoing debate over the Compact's treatment of
bottled water. It gives an overview of the debate between those who
support the bottled water exemption, referred to in this Note as the
"developers," and those who oppose the bottled water exemption,
referred to in this Note as the "preservationists." Part I also describes
the events leading up to the Compact. Among these events was the
completion of a study that found that the cumulative effect of
consumptive uses like bottling water and small-scale removals of
water from the Great Lakes basin, while uncertain, presented a threat
to the long-term sustainability of the Great Lakes. Part I argues that
the intense debate over bottled water in the Great Lakes is due, in
part, to different approaches by the developers and preservationists to
environmental decision making in the face of scientific uncertainty.
Both approaches would benefit from more information about
consumptive uses and small-scale removals of water.
Part II begins by describing the Compact's so-called "bottled water
loophole." Part II goes on to present the Compact's "information
loophole," and argues that the only way to resolve the debate over
bottled water, and other similar debates, is to close the information
loophole. Closing the information loophole will require both
improving measurement and reporting of water use and making data
available to the general public.
Part m argues that the Great Lakes states should require
registration and reporting for all non-negligible withdrawals. 20
Specifically, Part III proposes three concrete steps to increase the
amount of information available to decision makers and reduce
uncertainty. First, all non-negligible withdrawalS 2 1 should be reported

that "[c]onsumptive use is currently inferred by multiplying withdrawals against various
coefficients, depending on use type, but finding that due to rudimentary estimation techniques,
"[t]here are inconsistencies in the coefficients used by the various states and provinces.").
ISSee Compact § 4.1.5, 122 Stat. at 3748.
19 See id. § 8.3, 122 Stat. at 3762-63.
20 Although this Note suggests all withdrawals should be reported, it focuses solely on the
Compact's reporting and registration requirements for those who incorporate water into
products.
21 The Compact defines a withdrawal as "the taking of water from surface water or
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in the same way as diversions,22 removing the exemption for
withdrawals that are less than 100,000 gallons per day. Second, to
ensure accuracy in reporting, withdrawals should be metered and
audited on a regular basis. Third, information about the amount of
water that is withdrawn, incorporated into products, and shipped
out of the basin should be made available to the public. Together,
these three changes would help to improve decision making about
contentious issues, such as the so-called "bottled water loophole."
I. THE UNCERTAIN CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF WITHDRAWALS
A. The Debate over the Compact'sBottled Water Loophole
The ongoing debate over the bottled water exemption has been
characterized as an intense clash between "conservation and
commerce." 23 For analytical purposes, this Note characterizes the
debate as existing between two conflicting viewpoints: (1) the
"commerce" side of the debate-those who argue in favor of
permitting the export of bottled water and other products that contain
water-are called "developers;" and (2) the "conservation" side of the
debate-those who argue that the Compact should ban the export of
all water, including bottled water-are called "preservationists."
The developers argue that bottled water is no different than
products such as soft drinks and beer and that selling such products
outside of the Great Lakes basin should be permitted.24 In a free
market economy, they posit, bottled water companies should be
allowed to sell bottled water to any consumer who wishes to purchase
groundwater." Compact § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 3740-41.
22 The Compact defines a diversion as:
a transfer of Water from the Basin into another watershed, or from the watershed of
one of the Great Lakes into that of another by any means of transfer, including but
not limited to a pipeline, canal, tunnel, aqueduct, channel, modification of the
direction of a water course, a tanker ship, tanker truck or rail tanker but does not
apply to Water that is used in the Basin or a Great Lake watershed to manufacture or
produce a Product that is then transferred out of the Basin or watershed.
Compact § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 3740-41. Notably, withdrawing water in containers greater than five
gallons is a diversion under the Compact, but "[a] Party shall have the discretion, within its
jurisdiction, to determine the treatment of Proposals to Withdraw Water and to remove it from
the Basin in any container of 5.7 gallons or less." Compact § 4.12.10, 122 Stat. at 3757.
23 Lydersen, supra note 12.
24 See id. (discussing developers' arguments that since water goes into beer and soft
drinks, there should not be a separate standard for bottled water); see also Noah D. Hall, Toward
a New Horizontal Federalism:Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U.
COLO. L. REv. 405, 443 (2006) ("Industry sees no difference between bottles filled with pure
water and bottles filled with water and a little sugar, com syrup or artificial flavor. . . .").
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it, regardless of the purchaser's location.25 Selling bottled water, in
their view, is fundamentally different from sending water out of the
basin in a pipeline because bottled water undergoes a process within
the basin that incorporates it into a product.26 They claim, in addition,
that more stringent regulations on the export of bottled water would
violate international trade laws such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 27 and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).2 8 The developers also claim that state laws
already prevent any long-term damage to the Great Lakes ecosystem
that may occur as a result of withdrawing water to sell in bottles.
Finally, because the potential future effects are uncertain, the
developers would likely argue that no regulations should be placed on
bottled water until there is a demonstrable negative impact on the
ecosystem as a whole, if at all.
The preservationists, conversely, argue that there is fundamentally
no difference between a ship filled with Great Lakes water bound
for Asia, which the Compact prohibits, and a ship filled with bottles
of Great Lakes water bound for Asia, which the Compact permits.2 9
Water should not be considered a product, according to this view,
simply because someone puts it into a bottle and sells it. Under
this view, there is no significant difference between water in its
pristine state, such as a lake, and water that has been poured into a
bottle. According to the preservationists, even though exporting
bottled water may have no appreciable impact on the Great Lakes
today, the Compact should prevent private corporations from selling
Great Lakes water for a profit, in a bottle or otherwise. 30 The
See Lydersen, supra note 12.
See Hall, supra note 24, at 443 ("The bottled water industry views itself as an in-basin
consumptive use, creating a product (bottled water) from a natural resource.").
27 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
28 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT]. GAIT was incorporated into and modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results from the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1154 (1994).
See also Lydersen, supra note 12 (discussing the possibility that designating bottled water a
product and then regulating its export could be a violation of international trade agreements).
For a detailed discussion of the interaction between NAFTA, GATT, and the Compact, see Scott
S. Slater, State Water Resource Administration in the Free Trade Agreement Era: As Strong as
Ever, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 649, 713 (2007) (determining that "under any formulation, a state's
prospects of surviving challenges under NAFTA and GATT would become worse, not better, if
the state were to regulate beyond the Agreement and the Compact, and ban exports of water in
all containers of any size").
29 See Dave Dempsey, Other Voices: Loophole in Great Lakes Compact Allows Capture
of Water, MLIVE.COM, May 8, 2009, http://www.mlive.com/opinion/ann-arbor/index.ssf/2009/
05/other voices-loopholejin-great.html.
30 DAVE DEMPSEY, GREAT LAKES FOR SALE: FROM WHITECAPS TO BOTTLECAPS 95-99
25
26
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preservationists argue that water is a public resource, not a private
good, and that there is something morally wrong with companies
making large profits by selling a public good.3 1 Because the potential
future effects are uncertain, the preservationists would likely argue
that exporting bottled water from the Great Lakes basin should not be
permitted unless more information is gathered that demonstrates
conclusively that doing so will not undermine the sustainability of the
Great Lakes.
The arguments of the preservationists and the developers rest on
conflicting assumptions about whether exporting bottled water from
the Great Lakes basin will undermine the Compact's goal of ensuring
the long-term sustainability of the resource by leading to its long-term
depletion. To resolve this ongoing debate, both sides need more
information about the amount of water that is withdrawn,
incorporated into products, and exported from the Great Lakes basin
in products such as bottled water.
B. UncertaintyRegarding the Cumulative Impact of Future
Small-Scale Removals of Waterfrom the Great Lakes Basin
Water is essential, not only to life, but also to economic growth,
health, safety, and national security. 32 Ensuring access to water is
"one of the most daunting challenges faced by the world today." 33 A
United Nations report estimates that by 2025, two-thirds of the
world's population will be facing stress on their water resources and
1.8 billion people will be living in regions with "absolute water
scarcity." 34 Given society's need for water, and its scarcity in certain
regions of the world, many have argued that water, in terms of
geopolitical significance, is this century's "oil." 35 If this is the case,
then the Great Lakes region is this century's Saudi Arabia.

(2008). See generally MAUDE BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT: THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND
THE COMING BATTLE FOR THE RIGHT TO WATER (2007).
31 See Lydersen, supra note 12 (noting that preservationists have argued that bottling
water is "privatizing a public good and harming the environment").
32 See WAYNE ARNOLD ET AL., WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM ANNUAL MEETING 2008: THE
POWER OF COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION 17 (2008), available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf
/summitreports/am2008/am2008.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).
33Id. (quoting Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Secretary General).
3 UN Water, Coping with Water Scarcity: A Strategic Issue and Priorityfor System-Wide
Action, at 2, FAO/6788/F (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.unwater.org/downloads/water
scarcity.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Stephen Handelman, Exporting Fresh Water, TIME, Aug. 13, 2001, at B14,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1000535,00.html ("Water has
been called the oil of the 21st century.").
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The Great Lakes, together comprising the largest body of
freshwater in the world, contain eighteen percent of the world's fresh
surface water and ninety-five percent of North America's fresh
surface water. 36 The hydrologic system of the Great Lakes contains
nearly 5,440 cubic miles of water, 37 enough water to cover the
contiguous United States to a depth of 9.5 feet. It is estimated
that, below the surface, groundwater in the Great Lakes region has
as much volume as all of Lake Michigan. 39 The Great Lakes
groundwater and surface water spans eight states and two provinces:
the states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, and the provinces of Ontario
and Quebec.40
The eight states and two Canadian provinces are part of the Great
Lakes basin. A basin is "that portion of the earth's surface where
runoff terminates or accumulates in a common hydrologic feature,
such as a lake or river." 4 1 If a drop of rain falls into the Great Lakes
basin, it will eventually accumulate in the surface or groundwater of
the Great Lakes. While it is difficult to determine with precision, "on
average less than 1 percent of the waters of the Great Lakes is
renewed annually by precipitation, surface water runoff, and inflow
from groundwater sources."4 2 For this reason, many consider the
Great Lakes to be a "nonrenewable resource." 43 The best information
available suggests that, if more than one percent of Great Lakes
water is taken out of the basin, then the water levels of the basin
will decrease over time. The Aral Sea in Central Asia illustrates the
potential negative impact of withdrawing more water than is
replenished each year. The Aral Sea was once the fourth largest
inland body of water in the world, but it dropped to 10% of its
original volume in just a few decades because large-scale diversions
36 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (USGS), DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, USGS FS-2005-3113,
GREAT LAKES BASIN WATER AVAILABILITY AND USE: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL
ASSESSMENT OF WATER AVAILABILITY AND USE PROGRAM 1 (2005), available at

http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2005/3113/pdflFS2005_3113.pdf; INT'L JOINT COMM'N, 13TH BIENNIAL
REPORT ON GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY 5 (2006), available at http://www.ijc.org/php

/publications/pdf/lDI601.pdf.
37 N.G. GRANNEMANN ET AL., USGS, WATER-RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS REPORT
00-4008, THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUND WATER IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION 1 (2000).
38 ANNIN, supra note 3, at xiii.
3 See GREAT LAKES SCI. ADVISORY BD., PRIORITIES 2005-2007: PRIORITIES AND
PROGRESS UNDER THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT 4 (2008), available at

http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdffll622.pdf.
40 See JC 2000 REPORT, supra note 14, at 4 fig. 1.
41 Jay A. Leitch & Steven Shultz, Floods and Flooding, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WATER
SCIENCE 300 (B.A. Stewart & Terry A. Howell eds., Ist ed. 2003).
42 IC 2000 REPORT, supra note 14, at 6.
43 Id.
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for irrigation took out more water than was naturally replaced on an
annual basis."
Both human intervention and natural fluctuation affect the
hydraulic conditions of the Great Lakes.45 The Compact addresses
three types of human interventions: (1) diversions; (2) consumptive
uses; and (3) withdrawals. The Compact defines a diversion as a
"transfer of Water from the Basin into another watershed, or from the
watershed of one of the Great Lakes into that of another," but it
explicitly exempts products from this definition." A consumptive use
is defined by the Compact as that "portion of the Water Withdrawn or
withheld from the basin that is lost or otherwise not returned to the
Basin due to evaporation, incorporation into Products, or other
processes."47 A withdrawal is broadly defined as "the taking of water
from surface water or groundwater." 4 8
Currently, the total amount of water that leaves the basin due to
human intervention is more than the total amount of water that enters
it due to human intervention. 4 9 A Report by the International Joint
Commission ("UC Report"), which the Canadian and United States
governments requested in anticipation of developing the Compact,5 0
made three key findings: (1) the era of proposals for major water
transfers and major diversions of water has likely ended;5 1 (2)
although "the volume of water leaving the Great Lakes Basin in
bottles is not significant .. .. [t]here is nevertheless a need to monitor

[this activity] and keep [it] under review"; 52 and (3) the impact of
future consumptive uses, climate change, and small-scale removals of
water are uncertain, but, in their totality, these factors are likely to
place "downward pressures on water levels, with reinforcing
impacts."5 The ICJ Report warned that the interaction of insufficient
data, inadequate scientific understanding, and potentially adverse
cumulative effects of human intervention "suggests a need for great

4 ANNIN, supra note 3, at 23-24.
45 See UC 2000 REPORT, supra note 14, at 7.
46 Compact § 1.2, 122 Stat. 3739, 3740.
47 Id.

4 Id.
49 See UC 2000 REPORT, supra note 14, at 7.
5o See id. at 3.
11 See id. at 16. But see INT'L JOINT COMM'N, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE
GREAT LAKES: REVIEW OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE FEBRUARY 2000 REPORT 2 (2004)

[hereinafter UC 2004 REPORT] ("While there are not, at present, any active proposals for
diversions outside the Great Lakes Basin, except to communities on the edge of the basin, this
situation could change.").
52 UC 2000 REPORT, supra note 14, at 44.
53Id. at 22. The report did not give a definition of "small-scale."
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caution in dealing with those water use factors that are within the
control of Basin managers." 54
C. Proposalsfor Large-ScaleDiversion of Water Lead to the
Compact
The water-rich Great Lakes are a global anomaly. In many regions
of the United States and the world, freshwater is unavailable,
inaccessible, and scarce.55 In these regions, in the words of Mark
Twain, "whiskey is for drinking and water is for fighting over." 56
Water scarcity, however, has not only been the source of conflicts;
it has also been the source of innovation. Proposals for solving
the water scarcity problem have included seeding clouds, towing
icebergs, desalinizing salt water, and transporting water from one
location to another through pipelines.
There have been several proposals for transporting Great Lakes
water from the basin to other regions in order to meet those regions'
water needs. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, a coal company
developed a plan to construct a coal slurry pipeline from Wyoming
to the Great Lakes using water from Lake Superior. In 1982, the
Army Corps of Engineers, under a mandate from Congress, examined
the possibility of using Great Lakes water to replenish the Ogallala
Aquifer. 5 9 During a drought in New York City in 1985 and 1986, the
environment commissioner for New York State indicated that New
York would consider diverting water to meet the city's growing
needsi 0
One proposal, in particular, was influential in leading to the
Compact. The proposal came from Nova Group in 1998, which
devised a plan to help meet the growing demand for water in Asia by
shipping water from the Great Lakes to China.6 1 While this plan led
Id.
See UN Water, supra note 34, at 2.
Paul Harrison, Dirt Pour?,WASH. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, at A24 (noting that the quote
has been "famously ascribed to Mark Twain" and that "[tihere's no proof he actually said this,
but if he didn't, he should have"). The 260 water basins in the world that transcend national
borders have given rise to at least 500 conflicts over the last half century, at least seven of which
involved violence. U.N. Dep't of Public Info., From Water Wars to Bridges of Cooperation:
Exploring the Peace-Building Potential of a Shared Resource, http://www.un.orglevents/ten
stories/06/story.asp?storylD=2900# (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
5 See Anne Minard & Mitch Tobin, Water Solvable, ARIz. DAILY STAR, June 21, 2005, at
54

5
56

Al.-

A. See ANNIN, supra note 3, at 65; see also DEMPSEY, supra note 30, at 6 (discussing the
planned slurry pipeline, which eventually failed for economic reasons).
5 ANNiN, supra note 3, at 66; DEMPSEY, supra note 30, at 6.
60 ANNIN, supra note 3, at 78.
61 DEMPSEY, supra note 30, at 19-20.
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to public outcry and was a motivation for developing the Compact,
the UC Report determined that proposals for large-scale transfers
in the near future are unlikely. 62 Small-scale water withdrawal
activities, according to the UC Report, demand attention because
"[t]he impact of localized, small-scale activities may be difficult to
quantify on an individual basis but, collectively, [such activities]
can significantly alter the level and flow regime and associated
ecological conditions." 63 Professor Robert Glennon uses the analogy
of putting many straws into a milkshake to describe the cumulative
effect of groundwater withdrawals. 4 This analogy is also useful
for understanding the impact of withdrawals in the Great Lakes.
Because the future impact of small-scale activities and bottling
water is uncertain, monitoring these activities is essential. As
the UC Report concluded, "[in support of their decision-making,
governments should implement long-term monitoring programs
capable of detecting threats (including cumulative threats) to
ecosystem integrity."65 Monitoring is necessary in order to better
understand the total effect that all of the straws are having on the
milkshake. At the very least, the volume of milkshake being sipped
through the straws should be measured.
D. EnvironmentalDecision Making in the Midst of Uncertainty
One of the difficulties of managing natural resources like the
Great Lakes is the uncertain impact of human activities. Whereas
too little regulation fails to protect the resource, too much
regulation unnecessarily stifles the use of the resource to meet
human needs. How one determines the optimal degree of regulation
depends, in part, on the decision-making process one uses to make the
determination.
1. Solutions to the Uncertain Tragedy of the Great Lakes
Semi-Commons
Common resources, such as the Great Lakes, present a particular
dilemma that Garret Hardin described as "the tragedy of the
commons." 66 In order to illustrate the tragedy of the commons, Hardin

62 See

UC 2000 REPORT, supra note 14, at 16.
Id. at 20.
64 See Robert Glennon, Essay, Tales of French Fries and Bottled Water: The
Environmental Consequencesof GroundwaterPumping, 37 ENVTL. L. 3, 12 (2007).
65 UC 2000 REPORT, supra note 14, at 49-50.
6 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
63
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used the example of a common area for herdsman.67 A rational
herdsman, when deciding whether to add a new animal to the herd,
will consider the benefit to himself of adding a new animal against
the detriment to the common area, which the potential of overgrazing
presents.68 Because the benefit of adding a new animal is personal to
the herdsman, whereas its detriment is shared by the group, the
rational herdsman will always have an incentive to add the new
animal. 69 The "tragedy of the commons" is that the cumulative effect
of all such individual incentives ultimately "brings ruin to all."70
Subsequent scholars have noted relevant differences between
71
the commons Hardin describes and other natural resources.
Water resources in particular are more accurately described as a
"semicomnions" because they involve situations "where private and
common property overlap and potentially interact." 72 Professor Lee
Anne Fennell suggests that the semi-commons model is a useful
"lens" for understanding all commons tragedies.7 3 The driving force
behind all commons tragedies, Fennell maintains, is "the presence of
two (or more) activities that are being pursued at different scales
and under different property arrangements."74 The tragedy occurs at
the moment when the "mix of ownership types occurs under
circumstances that permit private ownership to be used as a platform
for offloading costs onto the commons, and that allow access to the
commons to be used for the benefit of private property."
Bottled water companies and other producers, no less than private
actors, benefit from withdrawing water from the Great Lakes basin
and offload some of the costs onto the commons through, at the very
least, a reduction in water volume. This is a classic example of a
misalignment of interests that incentivizes use of the resource. The
relevant question, then, is how to best solve this tragedy.
See id.
6 Id.
6 Id.
67

Id.
See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 675,
680-83 (2003) (discussing how Kenneth Boulding's notions of "cowboy" and "spaceman"
economies and Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen's application of theoretical physics to the use of
resources within economic processes challenge Hardin's notion that commons dilemmas can
only be solved through legislative controls).
72 Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50
ARIz. L. REv. 445,449 (2008).
73Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons 17 (John M. Olin Law
& Econ. Working Paper No.457,2009 & Chicago Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper No. 261, 2009), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edulfiles/files/457-261.pdf
[hereinafter Fennell, Semicommons].
70

71

74

Id. at 5.

75 Id.
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One solution is to realign the interests. Such a realignment could
be accomplished either by government coercion or by manipulating
the imposition of costs in such a way that the choices of
individual producers and consumers "more closely reflect[] the full
internalization of costs and benefits."7 6 The realignment could either
favor making the common area more private or making the private
right more common. The developers, presumably, would favor
realignment by transforming the common area into a private right.
The preservationists, alternatively, would more likely prefer increased
government regulation that curtails the private rights available to
bottled water companies.
These opposing solutions share a common problem: each requires
a determination of the optimal degree of regulation. While too little
regulation fails to prevent the tragedy, too much may produce an
"anticommons"-"underutilization of a resource due to overexclusion
of potential users, thereby decreasing aggregate social utility."77 For
this reason, more information about the potential costs and benefits of
permitting or restricting the export of bottled water from the Great
Lakes basin is essential to tailoring an efficient solution. Reducing
uncertainty is also essential to ending the political deadlock that
currently hampers any attempt to solve problems relating to the
sustainability of natural resources.78 This is true, in part, because
scientific uncertainty regarding a commons dilemma causes people to
both underestimate the extent of the problem and overestimate how
much they are doing to solve it. 79
2. Information as a Resourcefor Making DecisionsAbout Great
Lakes Water
Decisions about the management of natural resources often
involve uncertainties.80 The Great Lakes region is no exception.
Id. at 8.
Sean Callagy, The Water Moratorium: Takings, Markets, and Public Choice
Implications of Water Districts,35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 223, 227 (2008); see also Lee Anne Fennell,
Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 907, 983-90 (2004) (discussing several
examples of anticommons problems and potential solutions); Fennell, Semicommons, supra note
73, at 9-10 (discussing the inefficiencies that are created by anticommons problems).
7 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Essay, Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing
the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 259 (2000) (discussing the difficulties in determining how to
most fairly allocate the burden of solving problems of resource overuse because "there are
multiple ways to allocate the burden of reducing resource use and no generally accepted societal
norms for how to choose between the various allocations").
79 See id. (noting that ambiguity causes some to claim that a resource pool is large or act
as if it is, which then causes others to act in the same way in an effort to resolve the ambiguity).
76
7

PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE:
PRECAUTIONARY
0 See JACQUELINE PEEL, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY 41 (2005) (discussing
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Uncertainties include the effects of consumptive uses, climate change,
and small-scale removals on the Great Lakes basin. Much of these
uncertainties stem from the simple fact that environmental systems
are complex, but they are exacerbated by the lack of studies that have
been done to understand the hydrology of the Great Lakes system as a
whole.si
The debate between the developers and the preservationists rests,
in large part, on their respective predictions about what the future will
hold for the Great Lakes basin. The preservationists claim that the
export of bottled water will negatively affect the Great Lakes basin by
depleting the resource as a whole.82 The developers argue that the
export of bottled water promotes economic development and will
83
have no long-term negative impact on the hydrologic system.
In Eco-Pragmatism, Professor Daniel Farber discusses the
conflicting approaches to environmental decision making employed
by those he terms the "bean counters" and those he terms the "tree
huggers."84 The bean counters rely on a mostly quantitative
cost-benefit analysis to make environmental decisions, while the tree
huggers often reject the cost-benefit analysis in favor of other, more
qualitative means of making value judgments.s
Both the quantitative and qualitative approaches, taken alone, have
drawbacks. The preservationists, or "tree huggers," tend to "unduly
elevate[] so-called public values over mere private preferences,
putting the environment in one category and economic interests in the
other." 86 This approach may lead to unintended consequences, such
as failure to recognize the economic value of water. It may also
lead to a failure to appreciate the prohibitive costs and negligible
benefits of certain environmental policies. 8 In addition, some

the "high level of natural variability observed in many health and environmental systems").
81 See UC 2000 REPORT, supra note 14, at 20 ("The Commission is aware of only one
assessment of the overall effects of water diversions.").
82 See id.
83 See Lydersen, supra note 12 (discussing the public debate between bottlers and
environmentalists sparked by Nestle Waters' renewal of well and pipeline permits at its
Michigan and Ontario bottling facilities).
84 See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS INAN UNCERTAIN WORLD 39 (1999).
85 See id.
86Id.
8 See BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL
STATE OF THE WORLD 155 (Hugh Matthews trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (1998)

Lomborg observes that "[tihe problem of water waste occurs because water in many places is
not well priced." Id. This is because water prices are generally not market-driven, but instead
are based on flat rates, regardless of consumption. Id.
88See RESEARCH AND POLICY COMM. OF THE COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., WHAT PRICE
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preservationists assume that the mere fact that environmental
decisions are determined collectively through the democratic political
process instead of being left to market forces guarantees that such
decisions will be made in the public interest.89 In reality, however,
public officials will very likely make water allocation decisions
with the object of "maximiz[ing] the budgets of their agencies,"
or in response "to political pressure from important economic
constituencies." 90
The developers, or "bean counters," on the other hand, tend to
"misconceive[] the appropriate role for cost-benefit analysis by acting
as if economic efficiency [is] a sort of 'super value' that measures all
other values."9' In reality, the cost-benefit analysis has difficulty
"internalizing environmental values" and externalities and, as a result,
may fail to prevent significant environmental degradation.9 2 In
addition, market prices are often artificially influenced by government
policies and, therefore, do not present a complete picture of whether
particular environmental decisions make individuals "collectively
better off."93
Professor Farber suggests that a better approach to environmental
decision making involves a synthesis of the "bean counter" and "tree
hugger" approaches that recognizes both perspectives as different
ways of gathering information to resolve disputes over resource
allocation.94 For example, imagine that political leaders were deciding
whether to sell all of the water in Lake Superior to California.95 The
"bean counters," or developers, might employ the cost-benefit
analysis to determine how much money those living around Lake
Superior should receive in order to determine at what price the
transaction becomes an efficient use of water. The "tree huggers," or
preservationists, on the other hand, might put together a forum for a
discussion about whether or not selling all of the water is an
appropriate decision.

CLEAN AIR? A MARKET APPROACH TO ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 39 (1993) ("It is
not sound policy to choose environmental standards without giving consideration to both the
costs and the benefits.").
8 ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF
AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS 213-14 (2002).

9oId.

91FARBER, supra note 84, at 39.
9 GLENNON, supra note 89, at 214.

93FARBER, supra note

84, at 40.

9 See id. at 41.
95 The cost-benefit analysis, no doubt, can bring in a great deal of information in making
this decision. See id. at 36-49.
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Making important decisions about the environment requires
gathering information both from the market ("willingness to pay")
and the democratic process ("willingness to vote").96 Both the
''willingness to pay" and the "willingness to vote" may change with
new information. For example, if it undisputed that sending bottled
water out of the Great Lakes basin, along with all other future uses,
would never exceed the one percent renewal rate and would,
therefore, never have a negative impact on the total volume of water
in the Great Lakes, the decisions would likely merge. At that point,
the preservationists and developers would likely agree that sending
bottled water out of the Great Lakes basin was not only justifiable,
but preferred. In this way, information can be a valuable resource that
drives the decision-making engine of both camps. Put simply, more
information, not less, is preferred.97 Of course, information gathering
also comes at a cost.
E. Uncertaintyand InternationalLaw
The developers argue that the bottled water exception was
necessary because international law would prevent more stringent
regulations.9 8 This argument rests on the fact that the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) prevent blanket bans on the export of products out
of the United States.99 Whether NAFTA and GATT prohibit bans on
the export of water in containers turns on whether the containerized
water is considered a "good."'" Bottled water, for example, is
0 Because of that, a
considered a "good" under NAFTA and GATT.o'
ban on the export of bottled water would likely violate GATT and
NAFTA unless it falls under one of the relevant exceptions. 0 2 Other
prohibitions under the Compact, however, such as prohibiting the
diversion of water through pipelines, are exempt from NAIFTA and
GATT because "such regulations simply govern withdrawal and
conveyance of water, which are fundamental features of water
rights."' 03

See id. at 42.
Of course, the preservationists and developers would likely also employ different
approaches in order to determine how much information to gather.
98 Lydersen, supra note 12.
9 See Slater,supra note 28, at 676-77; see also DEMPSEY, supra note 30, at 68-69.
1ooSee Slater,supra note 28, at 710.
9
9

1

' See id. at 710-ll.

"0 See id. at 680; see also Lydersen, supra note 12.
10 3 See Slater, supra note 28, at 710.
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The preservationists might argue that more stringent regulations
should be upheld under one of the relevant exceptions provided by
NAFTA and GATT. There are at least two exceptions in Article XX
of GATT that are relevant to the potential treatment of exporting
products from the Great Lakes basin. First, the "health exception"
permits restrictions on product exports that are "necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health."105 Second, the "conservation
exception" 0 6 permits restrictions on product exports that "relat[e] to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption."10 7 NAFTA incorporates these exceptions
from GATT, but also requires that, when an export restriction is
added, it must not: (1) reduce the proportion of goods, compared to
the proportion exported in the most recent 36-month period, exported
to another Party to GATT; (2) result in a higher price for export
of goods than the price charged domestically; or (3) require the
disruption of normal channels of supply or normal proportions
among specific goods or categories of goods. 08 In addition to these
requirements, any restrictions on the export of products must be
"administered fairly with respect to foreign investors so [as] to avoid
liability under Chapter Eleven [of NAFTA], as well as U.S. due
process requirements, the dormant Commerce Clause, and regulatory
takings challenges."' 09
Obtaining more information about the amount of water that is
removed from the Great Lakes basin in products would accomplish
two things. First, as previously discussed, it would help policymakers
determine whether future regulations are necessary. Second, if
policymakers determine more regulation is necessary, then more
accurate information will be essential to tailoring a solution that will
survive challenges under NAFTA and GATT.
uC 2000 REPORT, supra note 14,

at 32.
GATT, supra note 28, art. XX(b); see also Slater, supra note 28, at 685-86 (discussing
the GATT "health exception").
1o6UC 2000 REPORT, supra note 14, at 32.
107
GATT, supranote 28, art. XX(g); see also Slater, supra note 28, at 685-86 (discussing
the GATT "conservation exception")
108
See NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 315(1).
109
Slater, supra note 28, at 706. In his article, Professor Slater describes, in greater detail,
that to be "administered fairly" the laws should:
10
05

(a) be adopted and applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to avoid violations of
NAFTA's Article 1102 (national treatment); (b) be administered in a non-arbitrary
manner with ample due process to avoid violations of NAFTA's Article 1105
(minimal standard of treatment); and (c) avoid direct expropriations to evade liability
under Article 1110 (expropriation compensation).
Id.
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II. THE COMPACT
A. The Compact's Bottled Water Loophole
To fully understand the Compact's treatment of bottled water and
other products that contain water, it is useful to examine the
Compact's treatment of three relevant stages. The first stage, the
withdrawal stage, occurs when water is taken from the Great Lakes in
its pristine and natural state. The second stage, the incorporation
stage, occurs when water is incorporated into a product. The third
stage, the export stage, occurs when the product is sent out of the
Great Lakes basin. It is the Compact's treatment of each stage,
interacting together, that results in the so-called bottled water
exception.
1. The Compact's Treatment of Withdrawing Water, IncorporatingIt
into Products, and Exporting It from the Basin
Whether or not a bottled water company, or some other producer,
is permitted to withdraw water is primarily left up to the individual
Great Lakes states (Parties)." 0 The Compact provides a model
"Decision-Making Standard,""' which sets out various criteria that
must be taken into account when approving proposals for new
withdrawals. States are not required to use the model standard, but
they are required to do two things under the Compact: (1) develop
their own standard for evaluating proposals to withdraw water that is
at least as strict as the model standard;1 2 and (2) determine, using
criteria set out in the Compact, which withdrawals and consumptive
uses will be subject to the standard by choosing a "threshold
level[]."ll 3 Proposals for withdrawals that are below the threshold
level are not subject to the Decision-Making Standard.1 4 If any state
n0 The Parties include Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342, §§ 1, 1.2, 122 Stat. 3739,
3739, 3741 (2008).
"' Id. § 4.11, 122 Stat. at 3755.
2
Il See id. § 4.10.1, 122 Stat. at 3755.
3
" Id. If a Party does not set a threshold level within ten years, the Compact will apply a
threshold level of 100,000 gallons per day. Id. § 4.10.2, 122 Stat. at 3755.
114The model Decision-Making Standard in the Compact requires that withdrawals and
consumptive uses be permitted only when: (1) all water withdrawn, less the consumptive use, is
returned to the Basin; (2) the withdrawal or consumptive use will not have "significant
individual or cumulative adverse impacts to the quantity or quality" of the water in the
watershed; (3) the withdrawal or consumptive use is implemented with "Environmentally Sound
and Economically Feasible Water Conservation Measures"; (4) the withdrawal complies with all
other applicable laws; and (5) the proposed use is reasonable based on the specific criteria for
evaluating reasonableness set out in the Compact. Id. §4.11, 122 Stat. at 3755-56.
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does not set a threshold level within ten years of the effective date
of the Compact, then the Compact will apply a threshold level of
100,000 gallons per day.
The more interesting question, relevant to the Compact's treatment
of bottled water, is whether a proposal to put water into bottles and
sell it outside of the basin should be treated as a withdrawal, subject
to the standards discussed above, or a diversion, subject to a general
ban discussed in greater detail below. A related question is whether
a proposal to fill a tanker ship with Great Lakes' .water and sell it
outside of the basin is a withdrawal or a diversion. The Compact's
answer to these questions turns on whether the proposal is to remove
water in a container of more or less than 5.7 gallons. A proposal to
withdraw water and remove it from the basin in containers of greater
With a
than 5.7 gallons is treated as "a Proposal for a Diversion."
few limited exceptions, it would not be permitted.'t 6 However, it is
up to the individual Parties to decide how to treat proposals for
withdrawing water and removing it from the basin in containers of 5.7
gallons or less.117
The distinction between water in containers of more or less than
5.7 gallons has been referred to as the "bottled water exception."
Some commentators posit that the number itself, 5.7 gallons,
corresponds with Ontario's decision, in response to Nova, to ban the
export of water in containers of more than 20 liters, or just over five
gallons." 8 The UC Report also referred to 20 liters, noting that, "at
this time, removal from the basin of water that is used for ballast or
that is in containers of 20 liters or less should be considered, prima
facie, not to endanger the integrity of the ecosystem of the Great
Lakes."" 9 As Professor Noah Hall described it, "[t]he question of
whether bottled water constitutes a diversion is so loaded with
political controversy that the governors decided not to conclusively
address it in the proposed compact." 2 0 Ultimately, the question is left
up to the states.
Given that products are generally exempt from the ban on
diversions, it is relevant to determine at what point water, after it is
withdrawn, changes from being water in its natural state to being
water incorporated into a product. This is especially important to
u5 Id. § 4.12.10, 122 Stat. at 3757.
6
1 Id. §4.8, 122 Stat. at 3752 ("All New or Increased Diversions are prohibited, except as
provided for in this Article."). The exceptions to the prohibition of diversions are listed in the
Compact at § 4.9, 122 Stat. at 3752-53.
7
" See id. at 3752-53.
8

" See ANNIN, supra note 3, at 233.

REPORT, supra note 14, at 47.
Hall, supra note 24, at 443.

19IJC 2000
120
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those who would like to prevent the export of bottled water from the
basin. Such people claim that bottled water should not be considered
a product and argue instead that there is no real distinction between a
ship filled with bottles and a tanker ship filled with water, like the
ship that was the subject of Nova's proposal. The Compact, however,
defines "product" broadly as "something produced in the basin by
human or mechanical effort or through agricultural processes and
used in manufacturing, commercial or other processes or intended for
intermediate or end use consumers."l 2 1 This broad definition leaves
much room for debate as to the distinction between water in its
natural state and water incorporated into a product.
Once the water is withdrawn and incorporated into a product, the
next relevant question for the drafters was whether to draft the
Compact in such a way as to regulate the export of those products.
The answer to that question in the version of the Compact that was
ultimately enacted into law differs substantially from the answer
found in the May 2005 draft. The May 2005 draft defined a diversion
as "a transfer of water from the Basin into another watershed, or from
the watershed of one of the Great Lakes into another."1 22 Under the
final version of the Compact, however, products are exempted from
the definition of diversion, and water containers that are deemed
"products" may therefore be exported out of the basin. 12 3
2. Driving a Tanker Ship Through the Bottled Water Loophole
The three Compact provisions, interacting together, have led some
to argue that the Compact actually has the unintended consequence
of making the Great Lakes more vulnerable than they would be
without the Compact. As Attorney James Olsen argued, "[i]t is hard
to conceive of a broader definition." 24 The definition of "product," is
121Compact

§ 1.2,

122 Stat. at 3741. The definition continues:

(i) Water used as part of the packaging of a Product shall be considered to be part of
the Product. (ii) Other than Water used as part of the packaging of a Product, Water
that is used primarily to transport materials in or out of the Basin is not a Product or
part of a Product. (iii) Except as provided in (i) above, Water which is transferred as
part of a public or private supply is not a Product or part of a Product. (iv) Water in
its natural state such as in lakes, rivers, reservoirs, aquifers, or water basins is not a
Product.
Id.

22

1 DEMPSEY, supra note 30, at 43.

123See Compact § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 3740 (stating that the definition of diversion "does not
apply to Water that is used in the Basin or a Great Lake watershed to manufacture or produce a
that is then transferred out of the Basin or watershed").
Product
124 James M. Olson, Navigating the Great Lakes Compact: Water, Public Trust, and
InternationalTrade Agreements, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1127-28.
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so broad that "any water export is arguably a 'product' and not
subject to the ban on diversions." 25 Imagine, for example, that Nova
puts a large bag in the hull of the ship, fills it with water, and sells
it to Asia. Arguably, the bag full of water has been "produced in
the Basin by human or mechanical effort" and is "intended for
intermediate or end use consumers."l26 In other words, it is a product
under the Compact and exempt from the ban on diversions. Under
this interpretation, the Compact seems to open the door for an
argument that large-scale water transfers are exempt from the ban on
diversions so long as a profit is being made.
B. The Compact's "InformationLoophole"
Determining whether or not more regulation of the bottled water
industry and other producers is appropriate depends in large part on
having an accurate understanding of how much water is withdrawn
and exported from the Great Lakes. Solutions to the tragedy of the
commons, decisions made employing the cost-benefit analysis for
regulating the bottled water industry, and value judgments made by
political groups all hinge on accurate information about the amount
of water withdrawn, and the impact those withdrawals have on the
hydrologic system.
Although debate over the Compact has focused on the so-called
bottled-water loophole, the Compact also has an "information
loophole," which results from the exemption of bottled water and
other products from the ban on diversions. Specifically, if products
were not exempted, but rather were treated as diversions, then the
states would be required to report all of the water that is shipped out
of the basin.127 However, because products are exempted from the
definition of diversion, they are treated merely as withdrawals.12 8 The
Compact requires the reporting of withdrawals only when they are
"in an amount of 100,000 gallons per day or greater average in
any 30-day period."l 29 The result is that withdrawals of fewer than
100,000 gallons per day go unreported unless individual states
adopt more stringent standards, even if the water that is withdrawn
is ultimately shipped out of the basin. The cumulative effect of
many users withdrawing 100,000 gallons per day-approximately
125Id. at 1128.
126Compact § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 3741.
127See id. § 4.1.3, 122 Stat. at 3747 (requiring registration of all diversions, regardless of
amount).
28
1 See id § 1.2, 122 Stat. at 3742 ("Withdrawal means the taking of water from surface
water or groundwater.").
29
1 Id. § 4.1.3, 122 Stat. at 3747.
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fifty-five Olympic-size swimming pools each year-is unlikely by
itself to deplete the Great Lakes over the long-term.13 0 However, the
cumulative effect of leaving such withdrawals unreported could result
in a gaping hole in the necessary information about the system as a
whole. The only way for anyone to know for certain, of course, is to
require reporting of those withdrawals.
Currently, only two states-Pennsylvania and Minnesota-require
reporting of withdrawals that are less than 100,000 gallons per day,
while the other states require reporting only of withdrawals that
exceed 100,000 gallons per day. 13 1 Pennsylvania requires reporting of
all withdrawals that exceed 10,000 gallons per day.1 32 Minnesota
requires that users install flow meters to measure and report water

130An Olympic-size swimming pool holds over 660,000 gallons of water. See
Memorandum from Anthony Andrews et al., Cong. Research Serv., to Eric J. Massa,
Cong. Research Serv., Natural Gas Drilling in the Marcellus Shale 16 (Sept. 9, 2009),
available at http://www.wvsoro.org/resources/marcellus/CRSMarcellus-Shale_09_09_09.pdf.
The hydrologic system of the Great Lakes contains nearly 5,440 cubic miles, close to 6
quadrillion gallons, of water. GRANNEMANN ET AL., supra note 37, at 1.
131See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, State Water Withdrawal Regulations,
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=18031 (last visited Aug. 31, 2010) (listing the latest state
requirements for water withdrawals); see also Russ HARDING, MACKINAC CTR. FOR
PUB. POLICY, GROUNDWATER REGULATION 12-17 (2005) (discussing the various permit,
registration, reporting, and aquifer protection regulations in the Great Lakes states). The
following survey summarizes the groundwater withdrawal reporting requirements in effect as of
January 3, 2010. Illinois requires that water users report all wells that exceed a capacity of
100,000 gallons per day. 525 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5.1(a) (West 2004). Indiana requires
reporting for significant water withdrawal facilities, defined as a facility capable of withdrawing
more than 100,000 gallons per day. IND. CODE ANN. § 14-25-7-15(a) (West 1998 & Supp.
2009). Michigan requires reporting of large quantity withdrawals, which are defined as
cumulative withdrawals that average more than 100,000 gallons per day over any thirty-day
period. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.32701(1)(aa), 324.32705(1) (West 2009). Minnesota
requires that water users install flow meters to measure and report the "quantity of water
appropriated," which includes all withdrawals, removals, or transfers, "regardless of how the
water is used." MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 103G.005(4), 103G.281(2) (West 2009). New York
requires that "[any person who withdraws or is operating any system or method of withdrawal
that has the capacity to withdraw more than 100,000 gallons of groundwater or surface water
per day at a single tract of land, water source or place of business shall file a report with the
department." N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-3301(1) (McKinney Supp. 2010). Ohio requires
registration and reporting of water withdrawals that exceed 100,000 gallons per day. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1521.16(A) (West 1996). Pennsylvania requires reporting of all withdrawals that
exceed 10,000 gallons per day. 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3118(a) (West 2009). Wisconsin
requires reporting of any surface water withdrawals that exceed 2,000,000 gallons per day and
also requires an annual pumping report from high-capacity wells that are capable of
withdrawing groundwater at a rate of 100,000 gallons per day or more. Wis. STAT. § 30.18(2)(b)
(2007);3 2 Wis. ADMIN. CODE [NR] § 820.13(2) (2007).
1 See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3118(a) ("[Elach public water supply agency and each
hydropower facility, irrespective of the amount of withdrawal, and each person whose total
withdrawal or withdrawal use from one or more points of withdrawal within a watershed
operated as a system either concurrently or sequentially exceeds an average rate of 10,000
gallons a day in a 30-day period shall register with the department the source, location and
amount of withdrawal or use or both.").
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withdrawals, regardless of whether they are incorporated into

products or not.13 3
Even most withdrawals that are reported, however, fail to paint an
adequate picture of water use. Much of the data is based on
"voluntary reporting, estimates, and models." 34 A 2004 report by the
IC, following up on the initial 2000 UC Report, concluded that a
"majority of water withdrawals and uses in the Great Lakes basin
are not metered and that . . . metering would dramatically enhance

the ability to conserve and better manage water use."1 35 Similarly,
the Great Lakes Commission concluded in 2003 that accurate
withdrawal data is "lacking for all water use categories for all
jurisdictions."l 3 6 The reason, according to the Commission, was
that "reporting consistency varies widely and withdrawal data is
mostly estimated."137 A "first step" toward remedying the problem,
according to the report, would be to require "actual measurements of
withdrawals and returns where feasible and [to] develop[] a quality
control system with audits of facility measurement."138
To fully understand the impact of incorporating Great Lakes water
into products, it is also useful to have an accurate picture of the
amount of water that is "lost" in the production process. The amount
of water lost is described as a "consumptive use," which is defined in
the Compact as the water that is "lost or otherwise not returned to the
133 Minnesota requires that water users install flow meters to measure and report the
"quantity of water appropriated," which includes all withdrawals, removals, or transfers,
"regardless of how the water is used." MINN. STAT. §§ 103G.005(4), 103G.281(2). Minnesota's
law also requires that "[a]n installation for appropriating or using water must be equipped with a
flow meter to measure the quantity of water appropriated within the degree of accuracy required
by rule." Id. § 103G.281(2); see also id. § 103G.005(4) (defining "appropriating" to mean
"withdrawal, removal, or transfer of water from its source regardless of how the water is used").
14STATE OF THE GREAT LAKES 2009, supra note 17, at 290.
135UC 2004 REPORT, supra note 51, at 12. Information gathering about water uses in the
Great Lakes basin has been sporadic. Chicago, Illinois, for example, did not require meters even
on newly constructed residences prior to 1982. See ANNIN, supranote 3, at 104. Not until 2003
did Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley announce that water meters would be required on all
residences, newly constructed or not. See id.
36
' PEBBLES, supra note 17, at 15. A recent report for the Illinois-based East-Central
Regional Water Supply Planning Committee, for example, found that

[w]ater withdrawals should be accurately reported as withdrawals, not total water
produced or used - It is evident in the data that water users are not all reporting the
same way. Some water users report how much water was sold to customers. Some
report how much water was produced. Some report how much water was used in the
cooling process. Some report how much water was withdrawn from the source.
These differences provide an inaccurate accounting system of water withdrawals.
BEN DZIEGIELEWSKI, W-rfMAN HYDRO PLANNING ASsocs., INC., WATER DEMAND SCENARIOS
FOR THE EAST-CENTRAL ILLINOIS PLANNING REGION: 2005-2050, at 239 (2008), available at

http://www.isws.illinois.edu/iswsdocs/wsp/ECILDemandRPT2008.pdf.
13 PEBBLES, supra note 17, at 15.
13s

Id.
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Basin due to evaporation, incorporation into Products, or other
processes."l3 9 Currently, much of the consumptive use data in the
Great Lakes is "inferred" by "multiplying withdrawals against various
coefficients, depending on use type."l 40 The data is often inaccurate,
because, as a 2009 report on the Great Lakes found:
Consumptive use is currently inferred by multiplying
withdrawals against various coefficients, depending on use
type. For instance, it is assumed that thermoelectric users
consume as little as 1% of withdrawals, compared to a loss
rate of 70-90% for irrigation .

. .

. There are inconsistencies

in the coefficients used by the various states and provinces.
Estimating techniques were even more rudimentary in the
past, making it problematic to discuss historical consumptive
use trends. Due to these data quality concerns, it may not yet
be appropriate to consider consumptive use as a water use
indicator. 141
Determining the amount of water that is incorporated into products
such as bottled water, therefore, is difficult both because the
withdrawal rates are often inaccurate and because the coefficients
are inconsistent from state to state. In addition, data does not reflect
the fact that some products are sent out of the basin and others
remain in it.
Even when withdrawal information is measured and reported,
however, the information is not always available to the general
public. Accurate and reliable information about water withdrawals is
essential to ensuring that the public is appropriately informed in order
to make decisions about water uses, such as bottled water.142 The
Compact itself states that one of its purposes is to "facilitate the
exchange of data, strengthen the scientific information base upon
Pub. L. No. 110-342, §§ 1, 1.2, 122 Stat. 3739, 3741 (2008).
'o STATE OF THE GREAT LAKES 2009, supranote 17, at 287-88
141Id. The report also notes that "[plermit or registration data, moreover, has limited utility
in locating users that are not required to register or obtain permits, such as the rural sector, or
facilities with a withdrawal capacity below the statutory threshold (100,000 gallons per day in
most jurisdictions)." Id. at 290.
42
1 See DZIEGIELEWSKI, supra note 136, at 239 (recommending that all water withdrawals
should be made public because "[als a public resource, the public should be able to see how
water in the region is being used"); see also LEROY P. KETTREN ET AL., INVESTIGATING THE
139Compact,

GROUNDWATER QUANTITY EFFEcrs ON ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN ACTIrrIES FOR INFORMED

GROUNDWATER POLICY 5 (2004), available at http://www.ucowr.siu.edu/proceedings/2004%20
Proceedings/2004%20UCOWR%2OConference%20Proceedings/Tuesday/PM2%20Technical%
20Sessions/Session%2016/Kettren.pdf (recommending that "[tiechnical hydrologic information
should be reviewed for understanding by non-professionals and should be made available in a
format that is easily accessible by the general public").
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which decisions are made and engage in consultation on the
potential effects of proposed Withdrawals and losses on the Waters
and Water Dependent Natural Resources of the Basin."l4 3 To fulfill
this purpose, the Compact mandates the creation of a water use
database that is "publicly available."'" However, the Compact only
requires aggregate information to be publicly available and permits
individual states to withhold information that they determine to be
confidential. 14 5 In Illinois, for example, most water use data for
private users is confidential.' A recent report prepared for a state
water planning committee recommended that:
[a]ll water withdrawals should be made public - Under
the current system, commercial & industrial and power
generation withdrawals are not available to the public due to
confidentiality agreements with the [Illinois State Water
Survey] (although some data is available through other public
records, such as the [Energy Information Administration]).

§ 1.3(2)(e), 122 Stat. at 3743.
'" See id. § 4.1(5), 122 Stat. at 3748.
145See id. §§ 4.1(5), 8.3, 122 Stat. at 3748, 3762-63. The Compact states that "[e]ach Party
shall annually report the information gathered pursuant to this Section to a Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence River Water use data base repository and aggregated information shall be made
publicly available, consistent with the confidentiality requirements in Section 8.3." Id. § 4.1(5),
122 Stat. at 3748. Section 8.3 states that:
143Compact

1. Nothing in this Compact requires a Party to breach confidentiality obligations
or requirements prohibiting disclosure, or to compromise security of commercially
sensitive or proprietary information.
2. A Party may take measures, including but not limited to deletion and
redaction, deemed necessary to protect any confidential, proprietary or commercially
sensitive information when distributing information to other Parties. The Party shall
summarize or paraphrase any such information in a manner sufficient for the Council
to exercise its authorities contained in this Compact.
Id. § 8.3(a)-(b), 122 Stat. at 3763; see also Christine A. Klein, The Law of the Lakes: From
Protectionism to Sustainability, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1259, 1275 (noting that, under the
Compact, "states may report and share data on an aggregated basis by type of use, without
identifying specific users" and that "data disclosure is further impeded by confidentiality
requirements").
146The Illinois Water Inventory Program is responsible for collecting information
about the mandatory reporting. The amount of water used by commercial and industrial
facilities is confidential. See Illinois State Water Survey, Illinois Water Inventory Program,
http://www.isws.illinois.edulgws/iwip/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2010) ("Commercial-Industrial
information is kept confidential: While the amount of water withdrawn by public wells and
intakes is public information, the amount of water used by commercial and industrial facilities
is not. Commercial-industrial pumpage, whether from wells or surface water intakes, is kept
confidential unless the facility grants a specific release of the data. Commercial-industrial data
is otherwise published only in combination with township or regional totals.").
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As a public resource, the public should be able to see how
water in the region is being used. 147
This withholding of confidential information, coupled with the
reporting of information in the aggregate rather than by individual
users, reduces the value to the general public of information regarding
the quantity of water being taken and the ways in which that water is
being used.
The Compact's focus on registration and reporting is well placed.
However, given the threat of many small straws drinking
simultaneously, it is ill-advised to rely on unmetered self-reporting
that permits some withdrawals to go unreported. This is especially
true because at least some bottled water companies and manufacturers
withdraw water at rates of fewer than 100,000 gallons per day.148
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION

The tension between the preservationists and developers is
generally demonstrated in the differing approaches both to the tragedy
of the commons and to the proper way to make decisions in the face
of uncertainty. This tension is most readily apparent in the debate
over the Compact's treatment of bottled water and other products that
leave the Great Lakes basin. Policymakers, when deciding how to
treat bottled water and other products in the future, can look to both
market information and political information as decision-making
guides.

47

1 DzIEGIELEWSKI, supra note 136, at 239.

148 One of the difficulties of determining how many users withdraw less than 100,000
gallons per day, or 69.5 gallons per minute, is the fact that most of the Great Lakes states do not
require reporting by users who withdrawal less than 100,000 gallons per day. See STATE OF THE
GREAT LAKES 2009, supra note 17, at 290 (noting that "only in a few states (Minnesota, Illinois,
Indiana and Ohio) are withdrawal data available per registered facility" and that the data has
limited usefulness in locating users that are not required to report or facilities that have a
capacity that is lower than the "statutory threshold"). However, there is evidence that at least
some producers, including bottled water companies and other users, withdraw less than
100,000 gallons per day. See Tom Brennan, Senior Natural Res. Manager, Nestle Waters
N. Am., Testimony Before the Massachusetts Legislature's Committee on Environment
Natural Resources Agriculture (Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://www.press.nestle
-watersna.com/pressfTestimony-delivered-by-Senior-Natural-Resource-Manager-Tom-Brennanbefore-the-Massachusetts-legislat.htm (noting that, in contrast to municipal supplies, "[a]
typical spring water source yields approximately 50-75 gallons per minute"); see also
Polaris Institute, Southern Exposure: Private Canadian Bottled Water Company Moves South,
http://www.polarisinstitute.org/southern-exposure-private-Canadianbottled waterscompanymovessouth (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (describing two cases where bottled water companies
withdrew 100,000 gallons per day or less and therefore were not required to report their
withdrawals).
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A. Ensuring More Accurate Reporting of Withdrawals, Small-Scale
Consumptive Uses, and Removals of Great Lakes Water
Given the conclusions of the IC 2000 Report-that the
cumulative impact of many straws slurping away at the Great Lakes
milkshake is uncertain and should be monitored-individual states
should adopt more stringent registration and reporting requirements.
These more stringent standards should aim at closing the information
loophole in order to reduce uncertainty and improve decision making
about the cumulative effect of exporting bottled water and other
water-containing products from the Great Lakes basin.
First, all non-negligible withdrawals, even those under 100,000
gallons per day, should be reported. Obviously, a determination
will need to be made as to precisely what level of withdrawals should
be considered to be negligible, and therefore escape reporting
requirements. Second, the Great Lakes states should work diligently
to improve the accuracy of information about withdrawals,
consumptive uses, and removals of Great Lakes water. Following
Minnesota's lead, those who withdraw Great Lakes water should be
required to meter their withdrawals, regardless of what the water
is used for.149 In addition, as the Great Lakes Commission has
recommended, users should be audited on a regular basis to ensure
the accuracy and diligence of their reporting.150 Third, the Great
Lakes states should standardize consumptive use coefficients. In
addition, the states should work together to improve the accuracy of
the consumptive use coefficients. Doing so will provide a solid
foundation for better understanding how much water leaves the
basin, and evaluating the arguments of both the developers and the
preservationists. Fourth, information about the amount of water that is
withdrawn, lost in consumptive uses such as incorporation into
products, and removed from the basin in any form should be made
easily accessible to the general public.

49
1 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 103G.005(4), 103G.281(2) (West 2009) (requiring that "[a]n
installation for appropriating or using water must be equipped with a flow meter to measure the
quantity of water appropriated within the degree of accuracy required by rule."); see also id. §
103G.005(4) (defining "appropriating" to mean "withdrawal, removal, or transfer of water from
its source regardless of how the water is used").
15oSee PEBBLES, supra note 17, at 15 (noting that a good first step would be to "require[e]
actual measurements of withdrawals and returns where feasible and develop[] a quality control
system with audits of facility measurement").
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B. Two Paths to One Solution
Under the Compact, there are two pathways to enacting more
stringent reporting requirements. First, the individual states could
follow Minnesota's lead and voluntarily adopt more stringent
registration and reporting requirements. 15 The weakness in this
solution is that the reporting system is only as strong as its weakest
link and, to be effective, all of the Great Lakes states would need to
enact similar reporting requirements.
Second, the Council of Review could either recommend or
require stricter reporting standards. Under the Compact, the Council
of Review can, after public hearing and comment, require
tougher standards by unanimously determining that the regulation
is "necessary for the implementation and enforcement of [the]
Compact."l 52 Alternatively, the Council of Review also has authority
to recommend more rigorous reporting requirements to the Parties. 15 3
C. Advantages and Disadvantagesof More Stringent Registrationand
Reporting Requirements
Enacting more stringent registration and reporting requirements
would have several advantages. First, having accurate information
would assist policymakers and scientists in determining whether or
not the total amount of water leaving the Great Lakes exceeds the
renewal rate. This information would be critical in determining
whether more regulation is necessary.
Second, if more regulation is necessary to ensure the sustainability
of the Great Lakes, the information would be useful for determining
what level of regulation is appropriate. Specifically, to address the
tragedy of the commons, it is important to know first whether there is
a potential tragedy and, second, the appropriate degree of regulation.
Third, more information-not only about how much water is taken
from the Great Lakes but also about the specific purposes for which it
will be used-would assist decision-makers in determining which
types of uses should be given preference. Assuming that one of the
threats to the long-term sustainability of the Great Lakes is the
potential cumulative impact of small-scale activities, policymakers
should require information about those small-scale activities in order
to make appropriate decisions about the allocation of resources.
See MINN. STAT. ANN.

§§

103G.005(4), 103G.281(2).
§ 3.3(1), 122 Stat. 3739, 3746 (2008).
53
See id. § 3.4, 122 Stat. at 3746-47 (imposing reporting requirements on each Party to
the Compact).
1s'

152Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342,
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Fourth, if increased future regulation is necessary, more
information would be useful in ensuring that policymakers can tailor
solutions that will survive challenges under NAFTA and GATT.
Specifically, this information would enable policymakers to enact
more stringent regulations by using it as evidence to demonstrate
that the regulations are necessary to protect life under the "health
exception," or to conserve exhaustible natural resources under the
"4conservation exception."' 54
There are also disadvantages to registering and reporting all water
withdrawals and product exports. First, information comes at a variety
of costs that need to be considered. These costs include, but are not
limited to, the costs of implementing the program and the costs to
the region if some businesses choose to move to locations with
less stringent reporting requirements.15 5 There would also be costs to
designing and implementing a system that quickly and efficiently
tracks products so as to distinguish those that are sent to locations
inside of the basin from those that are sent outside of the basin.
Second, the states will need to decide who should bear the costs of
the program. Given the necessary realignment of interests that helps
prevent a potential tragedy of the commons, it seems reasonable
to impose these costs on those who profit individually by taking
from the collective resource. Given the requirements in Minnesota,
Ontario, and Pennsylvania, these costs are unlikely to be prohibitive.
In fact, if the information tends to support the position of the
developers, the states will have a better foundation for arguing that
less restrictive regulations are appropriate and, in the long run, may
even recoup the costs of reporting. If, however, they are proved
wrong, then imposing the costs on the private enterprises will be
justified as means of addressing the potential tragedy that often
befalls common resources.
CONCLUSION

Developers and preservationists approach environmental decision
making in different ways. Their conclusions about whether more
bottled water regulation is necessary are different, in part, because
their assumptions are different. These differences may begin to
merge, or at least be debated with greater knowledge and clarity, with
'"See UC 2000 REPORT, supra note 14, at 33; see also GATT, supra note 28, art. XX;
Slater, supra note 28, at 685-86.
5 For a general discussion of costs associated with environmental regulations, see
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more information about water use in the Great Lakes states. The
private enterprises that are benefitting from using water that is
considered to be both a public and private resource should
shoulder the costs of providing the information. If the information
demonstrates that there is no negative effect from the cumulative
effects of many straws slurping at a single resource, then less
regulation is necessary. If the opposite is true, however, then more
regulation is necessary. In the final analysis, the information will help
determine if there is a problem and, if one exists, it will assist
policymakers in tailoring an effective solution.
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